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Covers 'blown' in U.S. intelligence

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WASHINGTON — The Soviets have identified nearly all the U.S. intelligence officers working in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and there is increasing evidence that security there was seriously breached as early as six years before the current sex-for-secrets scandal, congressional investigators say.

"They have correctly identified most of our intelligence people," said Rep. Daniel A. Mica, the Florida Democrat who chairs a House subcommittee investigating security breaches at the embassy.

"Everything has been blown," said Mica, who last week led a congressional inspection of the Moscow embassy.

The Soviets have learned the identities of Soviet citizens who held routine jobs in the embassy and secretly fed intelligence information to the United States, Mica said.

"A number of those executed as a result of what got out were Soviet citizens helping us," Mica said. "It's speculation, but I feel certain that's the case."

The Los Angeles Times reported Saturday that at least six Soviet citizens working secretly for U.S. intelligence agencies within the Soviet Union have been executed since late 1985, apparently because of security breaches at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

But State Department spokesman Frank Matthews would not comment on Mica's statements. "Our basic approach to these specific items of intelligence is just not to comment on them" for security reasons, he said.

A congressional intelligence expert familiar with the current spying allegations, speaking on the condition that he not be named, said information about executions of intelligence agents in the Soviet Union could not be corroborated. "Intelligence sources have dried up — that we know," he said.

But the official added that investigators are pursuing theories that the security of the Moscow embassy may have been breached as long ago as 1981. They suspect that partly because a Marine guard subsequently arrested on suspicion of espionage was stationed at the embassy that year.

Marine Sgt. John J. Weirick, 26, arrested April 7 for allegedly committing espionage at the U.S. Consulate in Leningrad, was a guard at the Moscow embassy from Oct. 22 to Nov. 17, 1981, said a Marine Corps spokesman.

Two other Marine guards, Sgt. Clayton J. Lonetree and Cpl. Arnold Bracy, have been charged with espionage for allegedly allowing KGB agents to explore sensitive areas of the embassy in early 1986. Although the latest security breach may be the most serious, Mica said yesterday that U.S. officials have evidence indicating that Soviets penetrated the embassy several years earlier.

In the mid-1980s, Soviet agents displayed their knowledge of U.S. intelligence personnel when they singled out embassy intelligence officers and followed their activities by using a tracking powder. The powder, invisible to the naked eye and unknowingly picked up by U.S. personnel, was used to identify people and objects the intelligence officers encountered.

"Who got dusted was an interesting phenomenon," Mica said. "The people who got dusted and the areas that got dusted were for people who had multiple duties." Intelligence officers typically take jobs unrelated to their espionage work to disguise their activities. In 1983, when the existence of the spy dust was revealed, State Department spokesman

Charles Redman said the Soviets had used it for several years.

In another incident pre-dating the latest Marine scandal, the State Department said in 1985 that it had discovered microphones in embassy typewriters capable of secretly transmitting the contents of anything typed on them.

Mica said the Soviets sidetracked the typewriters for one day during shipment from the United States and replaced their roller bars with ones containing microphones. To make the switch, Mica said, Soviet agents "must have access to simple things like the purchase order ... well enough in advance to have these roller bars made up."

Mica said U.S. security analysts attempting to block the Soviets from again penetrating the embassy are trying to determine if Soviet agents established a new route into it.

Mica said the agents' first job may have been to establish a "trapdoor" that would allow them into the embassy without the help of Marine guards. He said the KGB agents would have looked for "some way ... to disable alarms on your own without needing the original sources."

Mica said it would cost \$50 million to safeguard the embassy against further intrusion. All the security systems, including the cryptographic equipment used to transmit secret messages, must be inspected for signs of tampering. He said the equipment would be disassembled and shipped to the United States for examination.